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From May issue, NZ Manufacturer magazine Ian Walsh, Partner, Argon & Co While there are industries — car assembly, for example — where the economic case for local production can be debated, food is different. Producing food is something we should be doing. More than that, it is something we must do well. The story of Heinz — and by association Wattie’s — is one that is very near and dear to my heart. I have worked in this business on and off since the 1990s, in the UK, the US, and across ANZ. That lived experience matters, because this is not a theoretical discussion about ownership structures or ideology. It is a practical lesson in how value is built over decades — and how it can be lost just as surely. Under the leadership of Tony O’Reilly, Heinz became one of the great global food companies of the late twentieth century. Through the 1980s and early 1990s, the strategy was clear: disciplined international expansion, strong brand investment, and relentless focus on cost and productivity. The acquisition of Wattie’s in 1992 — for approximately NZ$565 million — fit this pattern perfectly: a category‑leading local brand with deep trust and export potential. Markets rewarded this approach. By the early 1990s, Heinz’s market value had grown to roughly US$10–15 billion. Scale, brand power, and operating discipline reinforced one another. But acquisition‑led growth is never free. Each successive wave of M&A expanded the footprint and lifted shareholder expectations. With every deal came aging assets, capital‑intensive manufacturing plants, and increasing complexity. To sustain growth and fund further acquisitions, the base business had to extract more productivity and cut costs. Over time, this narrowed the margin for error. Many manufacturing sites were already under‑capitalised when acquired. They required sustained reinvestment simply to remain competitive. Too […]